By defining the maxims by which we abide to make cooperative
speech as useful and efficient as possible, Grice also defines the way in which
we perform uncooperative speech: by defying those very maxims. As much as we
like to picture ourselves as undeceiving and completely cooperative, I think
that we all find ourselves in situations in which we break Grice’s maxims with
the intent to deceive from time to time. However, I think we are rather picky
when it comes to which maxims we break; particularly, I would wager that we are
most averse to breaking the maxim of quality than any else. Something about
lying affects our conscience more than, say, avoiding a question, even if the
end result is equivalent. Imagine the scenario below, in which Susan comes home
and finds that the last cookie from the kitchen is gone:
A: Susan: “Do you
know who ate the last cookie?”
Sally: “I don’t
know who ate it.”
B: Susan: “Do you
know who ate the last cookie?”
Sally: “I was
doing my homework this afternoon.”
C: Susan: “Do you
know who ate the last cookie?”
Sally: “I am not a
big fan of cookies.”
Of course, Sally did eat the cookie. The difference between
the cases above is in the maxim which she chose to defy. In case A, she defied the
maxim of quality by outright saying something which she knew was not true. She
ate the last cookie, and of course knew that she did so. The maxims being
disregarded in cases B and C are more open to interpretation, with relevance
and quantity likely being defied to some extent in both. Which specific maxim B
and C break is not entirely important; simply the fact that it is not the maxim
of quality is what interests me the most.
In each case, the effect of the interchange is essentially
the same: Susan is left with the idea that Sally did not eat the last cookie.
Surely, in B and C, Susan might inquire further and demand a straightforward
answer, such as yes or no, and one may argue that then the cases do not have
the same effect. However, these interchanges in isolation are all cases of
deception, and, if Susan is going to assume that Sally is being cooperative,
they will result in the same dismissal of Sally as the cookie-eating culprit in
Susan’s eyes. With this being said, I
would still imagine that Sally would have a lesser burden on her conscience in cases
B and C than in A, simply because she did not outright lie.
What is it about lying directly to someone that is more
troubling to our conscience than deceiving them in other, more indirect ways?
If the effect is the same, why do we deem lying as worse than a misleading but
true answer? Or, is my assumption that we treat these cases of deception
differently incorrect in the first place? Could such values placed upon
different ways of deception vary in different cultures?
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ReplyDeleteI find this topic intriguing! When I took Prof. Jeanne Tsai’s Culture and Emotion seminar last year, I did my final paper on cross-cultural differences between Westerners and East Asians in their construals of deception. What I’ve read leads me to think Grice’s maxims may be eurocentric, or at least more salient in European than non-European cultures.
ReplyDeleteCultural differences in construals of deception seem to operate on two levels:
(1) What is perceived as deception.
(2) Moral attitudes towards perceived deceptions.
Regarding (1): Westerners seem to classify more things as deceptive than do East Asians.
Under Information Manipulation Theory (IMT, McCornack, 1992), violations of quality are classified as lies, violations of quantity are classified as omission, violations of relevance are classified as evasion, and violations of manner are classified as equivocation. Whereas Westerners perceive all of these maxim violations to be deceptive, East Asians perceive only some maxim violations to be deceptive (Yeung, Levine, & Nishiyama, 1999), or alternatively, perceive all maxim violations to be deceptive but to a lesser degree than Westerners do (Lapinski & Levine, 2000).
Theoretically, this cultural difference may be due to the models of truth that are dominant in each culture. The dominant model of truth in Western culture is that there is only one, absolute, universal truth. East Asian culture, on the other hand, tends to view truth as situation-specific rather than universal. Furthermore, Western philosophy puts more emphasis on the idea that truth exists in a strict binary relation with untruth. There is no middle ground between truth and untruth: Either something is true or it isn’t. By contrast, East Asian philosophy has more tolerance of the idea of truth as multi-faceted and gradable.
Regarding (2): Westerners are more likely to rate violations of the maxims as morally bad than are East Asians. Given this difference in moral attitudes, we might expect Westerners to feel more guilt toward violating the maxims than East Asians would, even though there may not be any appreciable differences in the frequency of lies that both cultural groups report giving on a daily or weekly basis.
Westerners rated both pro-social and anti-social lies as (morally) bad, whereas East Asians rated lies about pro-social deeds as good and lies about anti-social deeds as bad (Lee et al., 1997; Lee et al., 2001; Fu et al., 2001). This difference in moral attitudes may arise partly because East Asian culture values modesty and group harmony to a higher degree than do Westerners. Some social situations in East Asian culture call for participants to violate the maxims in scripted, stereotypical ways in order to “save face” or “give face,” with the ultimate goal of preserving group harmony. For example, a host at a party is supposed to exaggerate his guest’s accomplishments when introducing him/her to other guests. Since everyone in the room knows the host is following this script, everyone can decode the truth underlying the host’s exaggerations – but since everyone can decode the truth, the host’s exaggerations are not construed as deceptive.